Citizen Coors is the riveting saga of an American dynasty. From the moment the destitute Prussian Adolph Coors stows away on a Baltimore-bound ship in 1868 to the worldwide expansion of the billion-dollar Coors Brewing Company, Citizen Coors is a headlong American tale of triumph over bare-knuckle competition.

Several companies are examining the prospect of launching rival bids for Molson Inc. And Adolph Coors Co. To break up the planned $8-billion merger between the two brewers, which could be announced as early as today. Bay Street sources who did not want to be identified said private-equity firms on both sides of the border are considering an offer for Molson, Canada's oldest and largest brewer. One banker said Onex Corp. Of Toronto, which launched a failed takeover bid for John Labatt Ltd.

In 1995, 'is thinking about it' and might enlist the help of a pension fund if it were to take a run at Molson. Image Line Deckadance Club Edition V1.62-AiR there. Onex managing director Nigel Wright declined to comment. The source said SABMiller -- formerly South African Breweries -- would also consider a bid for Coors.

Like Interbrew, it has been a voracious buyer of competing beer companies, and in 2002 bought Miller from Philip Morris Cos. A SAB-Coors combination would create a major new competitor to Anheuser-Busch, one that would own two of America's biggest-selling light beers. Any takeover bid is complicated by the family control of both companies. Molson chairman Eric Molson effectively controls about 55 per cent of its voting shares and, in theory, could block any deal he didn't want. The Coors family owns 100 per cent of that company's voting shares. There are several reasons why the two companies seek a marriage. They are of similar size, so neither party would dominate the other in a merged company.

More important, Molson and Coors have a partnership in which they brew and sell each other's brands in Canada and the United States. The Canadian part of it generates significant profits -- about $95-million (U.S.) in 2003, according to the Coors annual report -- because of the popularity of Coors Light here. A takeover of Coors by another company, particularly Interbrew, could put the partnership in jeopardy, damaging Molson's profitability. Molson earned $237-million (Canadian) in fiscal 2004. Family issues are also at play.

Ian Molson left the board last month in a dispute with cousin Eric Molson over leadership. Ian Molson owns 2.3 million shares, worth about $78-million, and is said by a source close to the situation to be motivated to get the best possible price in any deal. Heineken NV, based in Amsterdam, is also thought to be a contender for either Coors or Molson, although a Heineken executive said two months ago the company would not be that interested in Molson. Molson distributes Heineken in Canada, and the two companies are partners in Brazil, where Heineken owns 20 per cent of Molson subsidiary Cervejarias Kaiser Brasil SA. There are personal connections, too: Ian Molson is the godfather of one of the children of Charlene Lucille de Carvalho, the heiress to the Heineken fortune.

'Obviously that means it's easy for him to talk to people there, but I don't think that really means anything in terms of the potential for a deal,' said a source familiar with the situation. To have any chance to buy Molson, sources said, a bidder would have to launch a formal tender offer for Molson shares. In this scenario, the directors would be obligated to listen to the offer. A separate bid for Coors, though, would not necessarily have to be reviewed because of the peculiarities of U.S. Securities and takeover laws, a banker said. Law, Coors' and Molson's planned 'merger of equals' is not technically a sale; it is a strategic combination, he said.

As such, Coors directors would not be forced to evaluate a bid. 'This is called the 'Just say no' defence,' said one banker. 'They could just say the company isn't for sale.'

As the case opens in 1999, several key leaders at BlackRock, Inc., then a relatively small asset management firm, are trying to convince CEO Larry Fink and others that the firm should begin to offer Aladdin—its proprietary analytics and trading platform—to other asset managers. While some members of the senior team see “selling our systems” as an opportunity, others liken it to “selling weapons to the enemy” or “giving away the crown jewels.” What should Fink do?

The case provides an overview of the asset management industry, the beginnings of BlackRock, and details around the Aladdin platform. This case includes videos embedded in the text. In early 2006, BlackRock, Inc. Is considering acquiring Merrill Lynch’s asset management business. The asset management industry was in a state of transition. Non Us Citizen Drivers License Texas. In the prior year, more than 130 mergers and acquisitions had taken place. The proposed deal between BlackRock and Merrill Lynch would change BlackRock from a chiefly U.S.-based fixed income asset manager for institutional clients, to a firm with a global footprint and a strong equities and retail business.

Was this the right thing to do to grow BlackRock? Was the timing right? Was the price right? On June 11, 2009, BlackRock, Inc., the world’s fourth-largest asset manager announced it was acquiring Barclays Global Investors (BGI) for $13.5 billion in stock and cash. The deal would more than double BlackRock’s assets under management (AUM), making it the world’s largest asset manager. There was more than just a significant difference in investment philosophy that separated the two firms.

There were also significant cultural differences between New York-based BlackRock and San Francisco-based BGI. There was doubt internally at BlackRock and externally (i.e., analysts) whether it was the right move for BlackRock, but the firm’s co-founder and CEO Larry Fink was undeterred.